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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
LOESCHER, KENT, AND ENTREVIA
When the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kent v. Gulf
States Utilities Co.,' serious questions were raised as to the viability of
the so-called strict liability theory set forth in Loescher v. Parr.2 In par-
ticular, the Kent opinion allowed a defendant to introduce evidence of
reasonable care in his defense after a plaintiff had established that the
"thing" in defendant's control posed an unreasonable risk of injury.3
Under Loescher, such evidence is inadmissible because the crux of Loescher
is the statement that liability may arise for injury resulting from an
unreasonable risk of harm, "despite the fact that no personal negligent
act of inattention"" on the part of the defendant is proved. The Loescher
opinion then sums up the burden on the plaintiff as one requiring proof
of the vice, or unreasonable risk of injury, and that the damage resulted
from the vice. Addressing the defendant's posture, the court writes: "Once
this [unreasonable risk plus damage resulting therefrom] is proved, the
owner or guardian responsible for the person or thing can escape liability
only if he shows the harm was caused by the fault of the victim, by the
fault of a third person, or by an irresistible force." '
The literal language of Kent expanded the defensive possibilities
available to a defendant found to be the owner or custodian of a defec-
tive thing. Kent added to the three foregoing possibilities the additional
defense of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, which, in the
words of Kent itself, made the defendant's duty (to use reasonable care)
the same in the strict liability cases under Civil Code article 2317 and
in the ordinary negligence cases. The removal of the issue of reasonable
care from an action based on article 2317 was virtually the entire innova-
tion of Loescher and is the essence of the "strict liability" character of
the action. To allow a defendant to introduce the issue of reasonable care,
with supporting evidence, as proposed in Kent, was thus antithetical to
Loescher in the most basic sense.
It appears to this writer that the court in Entrevia v. Hood6 restored
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the Loescher theory to its pure and original form, through the simple
means of explaining the principles of fault under article 2317, by literally
quoting, and thus adopting anew, the essential passages of Loescher. The
court concluded its summary of the law under Loescher by writing:
[T]he injured person must prove that the building or its ap-
purtenances posed an unreasonable risk of harm to others, and
that his damage occurred through this risk. Upon proof of these
elements, the owner is responsible for the damages, unless he
proves that the damage was caused by the fault of the victim,
by the fault of a third person, or by an irresistible force.'
Entrevia thus removed the defendant's showing of due care as a permis-
sible defense by omitting it from the enumerated options available to a
defendant. Later in its opinion, the court also made specific reference
to Kent and categorized the Kent analysis of Loescher as a suggestion
for, or an indirect way of, furthering thoughtful insight into the strict
liability balancing process.'
The Entrevia opinion itself is a model of analysis under the Loescher
theory. A thing may be defective in form (rotten steps, hole in street)
and may still not pose an unreasonable risk of injury if the magnitude
of the risk and the likelihood of harm do not outweigh the utility of
the thing and the burden of preventing the risk. Under the Entrevia facts,
the likelihood of injury or harm was low because no persons were likely
to use the building with its fence and "no trespassing" signs; while rot-
ten steps are hazardous, they do not carry the same gravity of harm as
one might assign to uninsulated, high voltage electrical lines; the utility
of such old buildings is high, for if hay is stored there, another storage
building need not be constructed; and if all such buildings have to be
either torn down or maintained in a safe condition, the economic burden
on farmers would be intolerable. Hence, even though the steps were rot-
ten, they did not pose an unreasonable risk under the scrutiny of the
balancing process.
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY CASES
In Hebert v. Gulf States Utilities Co.,' the Louisiana Supreme Court
clarified the duty of electrical utility companies in the handling of their
high power lines. Kent had created a question of whether electrical utility
companies were under the standard of negligence or of strict liability, even
though the Kent decision was rendered on the basis of negligence. Hebert
makes it very clear that the duty is one of "utmost care": "Electric
transmission companies which maintain and employ high powered lines
7. Id. at 1148 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 1150.
9. 426 So. 2d I11 (La. 1983).
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are required to exercise the utmost care to reduce hazards to life as far
as practicable. . . . However, an electric utility is not required to guard
against situations which cannot reasonably be expected or contemplated.""
The court specified that the practical safety measures that might be
required under this high duty of care may include (1) the insulation of
the lines, (2) warning adequately of the danger or (3) taking other proper
and reasonable precautions to prevent injury.
The court found that the defendant had not satisfied its three-fold
duty under the circumstances of this case. The plaintiff was working in
the construction of a building which rose closer and closer to existing
high power lines as construction progressed. The plaintiff was working
on the top of the building and he therefore came closer and closer to
the power lines until finally he touched a metal beam to the high power
line and was thrown to the ground by the resulting shock.
The court, in determining whether the defendant had discharged its
duty, emphasized the actual knowledge of the defendant that the high
power lines were a potential hazard (a crane at the same site had previously
hit the power line, knocking out service temporarily). The court reasoned
that upon obtaining this knowledge, the defendant's duty was to take
reasonable measures to assure that workers were able to work without
an unreasonable risk of harm. The court found that reasonable measures
could include de-energizing the entire line adjacent to the construction
site, rerouting the energy supply or placing temporary insulation similar
to rubber hoses on the lines. The court emphasized that it was within
the power of the defendant to make the workplace safe, and that the
defendant had not done so.
The Hebert opinion obviously signifies a sharply increased practical
burden on defendant electric utility companies. Concomitantly with this
increased burden is an apparent tightening of the requirements to prove
assumption of risk or contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
workman. The stringent measure of duty applied by Hebert was achieved
without application of so-called strict liability, which the court specifi-
cally disavowed as the basis for electric utility liability.
In Meche v. Gulf States Utilities Co.," the Louisiana Supreme Court
went even further in its requirement of care on the part of the electric
utilities. A father was killed and his son seriously injured when they at-
tempted to install an antenna nearly twenty-eight feet tall on top of their
trailer located in a trailer park. The attempt to erect the antenna took
place at night by the light of the headlights of two vehicles. The antenna
contacted a high-power electric line running across the park twenty-three
"feet above the ground, causing the death and injury.
10. Id. at 114 (citations omitted).
11. 436 So. 2d 538 (La. 1983).
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The jury in the trial court, and the court of appeal, found that the
defendant was not negligent; the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing that the defendant failed to take special precautions for the special
risk attendant upon extending a high voltage line through the interior of
a trailer park. The court found that the lines could have been placed higher
and that no effective warning of the presence of wires was given to the
occupants of the trailer park.
Meche presents no new legal analysis of the duty of electric utilities,
but applies the standards enunciated in Hebert which were not satisfied
by the defendant. This writer must agree with the dissent of Justice
Blanche, in which he observes that it was hardly foreseeable that an in-
dividual would raise a twenty-seven foot antenna directly into an elec-
trical line during the hours of total darkness.'" The majority opinion, in
considering the issue of contributory negligence of the victims, found that
there was no way the victims could have anticipated that the wire was
there above them. It seems equally true that the defendant had no realistic
way of knowing that such an antenna-raising would take place in the
darkness of night. Contrary to Hebert, there was no specific incident what-
soever to put the utility company on notice that the occupants of the
park might be endangered by this line. It is the wisdom of the court that
is being exercised in determining who should bear this loss, and in light
of Hebert and Meche, it is clear that the court considers the electric util-
ity company a satisfactory risk-distributor.
12. Id. at 542 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
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